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ARTICLES

IMMIGRATION AND
ORIGINAL OWNERSHIP OF THE EARTH
MICHAEL BLAKE*
MATHIAS RISSE**

Among the most striking features of the political arrangements on
this planet is its division into sovereign states. To be sure, in recent
times, globalization has woven together the fates of communities and
individuals in distant parts of the world in complex ways. It is partly for
this reason that now hardly anyone champions a notion of sovereignty
that would entirely discount a state's liability for the effects that its
actions would have on foreign nationals. Still, state sovereignty persists
as a political fact. The number of states has increased enormously due to
upheavals of the twentieth century, and there is nothing in principle
morally wrong with the existence of states-or so we will assume.'
*
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Many thanks to Charles Beitz, Eric Cavallero, Howard Chang, Angus Deaton,
Nicole Hassoun, Malgorzata Kurjanska, David Miller, Matthew Noah Smith, and two
referees for this journal for comments or discussions, as well as to an audience at
Princeton University, where the paper was presented in October 2006 (especially to Elizabeth Harman, who was the commentator). Thanks to Bill Clark for an exchange regarding the proposed measure of relative over- and under-use of resources, as well as for help
in making contacts to other scientists interested in this question (to be mentioned below).
Thanks to George Borjas for a conversation on the economics of immigration.

1. See ABRAM CHAYEs & ANTONIA H. CHAYEs, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENT (1995). See also F.H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 26 (2d ed. 1986) (giving a classical statement of the view of
sovereignty as "absolute" power); Robert 0. Keohane, Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional
Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in InternationalSociety, in WHOSE WORLD ORDER?
UNEVEN GLOBALIZATION AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR

(Hans-Henrik Holm &

Georg Sorensen eds., 1995) (attempting to characterize sovereignty in a way that accounts
for increasing political and economic interconnectedness); CHRISTOPHER W. MORRIS,
AN ESSAY ON THE MODERN STATE (1998) (arguing that such a stance not only fails to
describe the reality of states, but is also undesirable); Mathias Risse, What We Owe to the
Global Poor, 9 J. ETHICS 81 (2005) and Mathias Risse, What to Say About the State, 32
Soc. THEORY & PRAc. 671 (2006) (arguing in support of states). What "in principle"
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What must be explored, then, are the limits of normatively plausible
sovereignty. How bad does a government have to be for outsiders to be
allowed to interfere? What responsibilities does a country incur because
of its contribution to global warming? What obligations arise through
trading? In this paper, we explore another pertinent question: to what
extent is a country allowed to influence who lives on its territory by
regulating immigration? The angle from which we approach this question continues to be neglected even now that questions of global justice
are receiving much attention. Immigration amounts to a change in political relationship, as immigrants alter their standing within one community and acquire a status elsewhere. Yet, it also amounts to an alteration
in physical relationship, since the immigrants acquire a relationship to a
territory, making a life for themselves with the resources offered by a part
of the earth.2 We base our exploration of these questions on reflections
on the original ownership status of the earth. Since the earth is simply
there, with no one deserving credit for it, a plausible view on original
ownership is that all humans have some sort of symmetrical claim to it.
The philosophically most plausible conception of this collective ownership needs to be clarified.'
This is not to say that the world's territory now ought to be redistributed. Instead, we contend that the collective ownership status of the
earth may limit acceptable regimes of property, including regimes of
immigration. Our views will be compatible with states controlling property within their boundaries. However, this will have to flow from an
argument assessing how to understand the view that the earth is originally collectively owned by humanity. ("Original" ownership is not
related to time. It is a moral status that the earth may have and one that
would have conceptual and moral priority over individual appropriation.)
The standpoint of collective ownership has potential to be illuminating
for a range of other issues as well as arise in debates about global justice,
but here we are merely concerned with immigration. We are not the first
means is at stake in this study, as well as when it comes to answering those questions
introduced in the next paragraph of the text of this article.
2. This latter form of change is also potentially understood as a form of political
alteration, inasmuch as property relationships are ultimately relationships between persons. Nonetheless, the two forms of alteration are relevantly distinct and ought to be
treated as such.
3. We use the term "resources" for materials that are present on this planet without human contribution (air, soil, raw materials such as minerals, coal, and water).
David Schmidtz objects to the picture of the lucky first-comers who effortlessly appropri-

ate and leave little for others. David Schmidtz, The Institution of Property, in ENVIRON(David Schmidtz
& Elizabeth Willott eds., 2002). Yet if the earth originally is common property, appropriation must be constrained by this fact, regardless of whether it was a joy or a pain to be
first occupiers. Even if there is a duty to cultivate wasteland, as Schmidtz suggests, use of
the privatized property will be constrained by the original ownership status.
MENTAL ETHICS: WHAT REALLY MATTERS, WHAT REALLY WoRiKs I
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to assert such ownership or to deduce its implications for the movement
of individuals. Kant, for one, thought the communal possession of the
earth's surface is one basis of the cosmopolitan right of resort.' According to Kant, this right does not entitle one to immigration, but grants
mobility and safety in foreign lands. 5 Yet, no reason is given for the
relatively restricted nature of this right. More robust rights to immigration emerge from a fuller accounting of such ownership.
Most debates about immigration concern the policies of specific
nations. A significant amount of social science literature has emerged
around the question of what forms of immigration are best for a particular state.6 What is "best" for a country may be hard to assess; it can turn
4. See IMMANUEL KANT, 1 THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS: METAPHYSICAL FIRST
PRINCIPLES OF THE DOCTRINE OF RIGHT §§ 6, 13 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797); see also IMMANUEL KANT, To PERPETUAL PEACE: A
PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH 16 (Ted Humphrey trans., Hackett Pubrg 2003) (1795) [hereinafter KANT, To PERPETUAL PEACE]. For a commentary, see A. JOHN SIMMONS, JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 179-96 (2001).

The question of the original ownership of the earth greatly exercised political theorists in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Among the urgent intellectual questions of
that age were questions of the legitimacy of colonial acquisition and ownership of the seas
and questions related to views about the original ownership status of the earth. See RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTER-

NATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 207-34 (1999). See generally John
Kilcullen, The Origin of Property: Ockham, Grotius, Pufendorf and Some Others (2001),
http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/wprop.html
(providing medieval background of this debate). The ownership perspective is not commonly present in contemporary debates about global justice. However, lest one finds this angle rather peculiar,
one should keep in mind the historical dimensions of these issues.
5. KANT, To PERPETUAL PEACE, supra note 4, at 15-16.
6. Questions about immigration that social scientists investigate include: Who
wants to immigrate in the first place? How does immigration affect labor markets, tax
revenues, and the welfare system? How does it affect crime? How do immigrants assimilate? What is the impact of immigration on population redistribution and on population
change? What is the impact of domestic policy on immigration? What does the native
population expect from immigration? Who are the losers and beneficiaries from immigration? For a discussion of the economic impact of immigration in the United States,
see GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY (2001); THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE: STUDIES ON THE ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 224-37 (James P. Smith & Barry
Edmonston eds., 1998); ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF IMMIGRATION (George J. Borjas
ed., 2000); and THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL
EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997). For a
history of immigration to the United States, see generally Gerry Mackie, U.S. Immigra-

tion Policy and Local Justice, in LoCAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 227-90 (Jon Elster ed.,
1995). For a (slightly dated) review of immigration issues across different countries, see
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON INTERNAL MIGRATION (Charles B. Nam, William J.

Serow & David F. Sly eds., 1990). For a discussion of assimilation in the United States,
see REINVENTING THE MELTING POT: THE NEW IMMIGRANTS AND WHAT IT MEANS

TO BE AMERICAN (Tamar Jacoby ed., 2004). For a positive view on the impact of immigrants on the United States, see JOEL MILLMAN, THE OTHER AMERICANS: How IMMI-
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on conflicting cultural, political, or economic considerations, and what is
beneficial from any such viewpoint for one segment of the population
may not be for others. 7 Yet, this standpoint tends to view immigration as
a privilege and neglects to ask whether it is disregarding duties to wouldbe immigrants.' Hence, this literature would benefit from more normative inquiry. We aspire to fill in this gap by focusing on whether the
physical aspect of immigration provides general constraints on immigration policy. One may even talk of a human right to immigration based
GRANTS RENEW OUR COUNTRY, OUR ECONOMY, AND OUR VALUES (1997); see also
JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION (1989). For
arguments that recent immigration threatens the core of its alleged Anglo-Protestant
identity, see SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S
NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004). For references to the small philosophical literature on
immigration, see Michael Blake, Immigration, in A COMPANION TO APPLIED ETHICS 224
(R.G. Frey & Christopher Heath Wellman eds., 2003). Some of that literature will be
discussed as we go along.
7. BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR, supra note 6, at xiv, 16, 186-88:
The United States will inevitably attract more immigrants than the country is
willing to admit. As a result, choices have to be made. Current immigration
policy benefits some Americans (the newly arrived immigrants as well as those
who employ and use the services the immigrants provide) at the expense of
others (those Americans who happen to have skills that compete directly with
those of immigrants). Before deciding how many and which immigrants to
admit, the country must determine which groups of Americans should be the
winners and which should be the losers.
Borjas counts immigrants among the beneficiaries, but does not count those rejected for
immigration among those at whose expense the respective policy goes. Borjas later refers
to questions of fairness to those excluded, but without engaging them in depth. Peter
Brimelow calls immigration "a luxury for the United States, not... a necessity." PETER
BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION DISAS-

TER (1995) (implying that there is no obligation to outsiders on this matter). Roy Beck
expresses outrage at the United States government for accepting more immigrants allegedly to keep wages low. RoY BECK, THE CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION: THE MORAL,
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL REASONS FOR REDUCING U.S. IMMIGRATION BACK TO TRADITIONAL LEVELS (1996). No question is raised about entitlements

of would-be immigrants.
8. Some countries offer support for new immigrants, but none take redistributive
measures to give immigrants credit for being latecomers. For a survey of how U.S. states
aid immigrants, see Bill Ong Hing, Answering Challenges of the New Immigrant-Driven
Diversity: ConsideringIntegration Strategies, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 861 (2001). For an account
of the European Union's efforts, see COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT ON MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION (2004), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/employment social/employment analysis/imm/com_508_en.pdf.
Some
have argued that borders are an economic oddity since returns to labor depend on one's
country. See James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, Trade Costs, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 691 (2004). This view was also famously defended by Adam Smith and Milton
Friedman. Under such a view, immigration is a solution to an impediment of the market, one that should follow naturally now that constraints on the movement of services,
goods, and capital are lifted more and more. However, such a view is justified only if
little can be said for the validity of borders, which in turn must be assessed through an
inquiry into the nature of original ownership.
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on original common ownership. While this is a useful way of thinking
about these questions, we will not pursue them in these terms, so as to
avoid a belaboring introduction of machinery needed to work with such
vocabulary. 9
Our guiding thought is simple: if the earth is originally collectively
owned, this fact must affect how political communities can regulate
access to the part of the earth they occupy. Yet, that thought is surprisingly hard to develop. Since we will be unable to come to conclusive
views with regard to all questions that arise in this context, we hope this
study triggers more work spelling out the common-ownership perspective
on questions of immigration.
We must first develop the notion of common ownership as the most
plausible interpretation of the idea that humanity collectively owns the
earth. Such ownership is a relatively weak version of collective ownership, one compatible with the existence of states. While it will turn out
to be a relatively indeterminate version of ownership, it nonetheless will
constrain immigration control. Later, a key move will introduce the
notion of relative overuse or underuse of resources. As no measure of the
sort that we envisage is currently in use, for now we will be unable to
think through what this measure entails for specific cases. Foremost, we
seek to apply the standpoint of common ownership to immigration. If
this view is found convincing, it may lead to more empirical work
required to construct such a measure. Regardless, there are important
implications of this perspective. In particular, it stresses that reflections
on immigration must consider more than domestic concerns and ushers
9. We ignore two groups who may demand access. The first is individuals with a
morally overwhelming case for entry independent of any right to immigration based on
original ownership; the second consists of those with an overwhelming case for rejection.
It is unclear how to draw the contours of these groups, but moral questions about immigration per se arise about people who belong to neither, and we assume that third group
is non-empty. A reference to David Miller and Christopher H. Wellman is appropriate.
Miller rejects standard arguments for open borders, his main point being that the alleged
rights grounding such a demand do not correspond to duties of others. David Miller,
Immigration: The Casefor Limits, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS 193,
196-98 (Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher H. Wellman eds., 2005); Christopher Heath
Wellman, Immigration and Freedom of Association, 119 ETHICS 109 (2008). The common-ownership standpoint, however, shows how such duties can be generated.
Nevertheless, our overall project is friendly to Miller's because the (culture and population-size driven) reasons for exclusion he favors can be reproduced from the commonownership standpoint, except that the culture-based argument must be qualified. Wellman argues for a country's right to control immigration by appeal to the value of freedom
of association. Any person X has the right to associate with any Y, says Wellman, but
only if Y consents; since we attach much value to such freedom, a right to regulate immigration follows. From the standpoint developed here, one must ask whether such freedom of association holds regardless of the size of the association, and we respond
negatively. But again, our overall attitude towards this approach is friendly, since much
of it can be reproduced from our standpoint, except that, again, arguments to restrict
immigration must be modified.
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forth questions about the extent to which immigration can discharge a
duty to aid. Moreover, it entails that certain responsibilities are a matter
of justice, rather than charity.
What does it mean that the earth is originally owned by humanity?
Initially, one may regard assertions of this form as nonsensical. For
instance, Hobbes, in Chapter XIII of the Leviathan, claims that "mine"
and "thine" are not meaningful absent a state that could enforce ownership."0 This view gains plausibility if we consider that ownership is a
complex system of rights and duties: explicating what it means to own
something involves many different concepts and relationships, and one
would need a thick moral theory to make sure they are available outside
of a legal framework.1 1 Yet, even if we grant that "mine" and "thine" are
fully specified only within legal systems, we may ask whether there are
less robust property rights outside of such frameworks that appear plausible in light of facts about physical resources.
It is appropriate to examine such property rights for two reasons:
first, such resources are necessary for any human activities to unfold; second, those resources have come into existence without human interference.
These reasons must be considered when individual
accomplishments are used to justify property rights that are strong
enough to determine use across generations. Consider the argument
from first occupancy, according to which land belongs to first takers.
This view is problematic because the sheer fact that one came to a place
first is not of sufficient moral weight to grant ownership that resonates
through the ages given that the resources are needed by all and their
existence is nobody's accomplishment. Yet precisely this is common
practice. The same difficulties are true for a Lockean labor theory of
acquisition. 12
EgalitarianOwnership is the view that the earth "originally" belongs
to humankind collectively, 13 in the sense that all humans, no matter
when and where they are born, must have some sort of symmetrical claim
10. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 101 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Macmillan
Publ'g 1974) (1651).
11. For a discussion of property, see generally Tony Honor6, Ownership, in MAKING LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 161 (Tony Honor6 ed., 1987); see
also LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS (1977);
and ANDREW REEVE, PROPERTY (Peter Jones & Albert Weale eds., 1986).
12. See BECKER, supra note 11, at 33-56 (listing the fundamental aspects of Lockean Property Theory and its application); see also REEVE, supra note 11, at 51-57. But see
GOPAL SREENIVASAN, THE LIMITS OF LocKEAN RIGHTS IN PROPERTY (1995) (enumer-

ating problems and limitations of Locke's account and citing the proposition that which
theory of property is followed may have implications for resource use over time such that
a generation may be morally precluded, for example, from depleting resources that might
be beneficial to future generations).
13. Mathias Risse, How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?, 33 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 349, 359 (2005).
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to them. ("Original" ownership, again, does not relate to time but is a
moral status.) We assert that this is the most plausible view of the ownership of natural resources, and this is so precisely because of the two
points mentioned above: namely, that the existence of the resources of
the earth is nobody's accomplishment, whereas they are needed for any
human activities to unfold. Egalitarian Ownership must be understood
as detached from the complex set of rights and duties civil law delineates
under the heading of property law.' 4 At this level of abstraction from
conventions and codes that themselves have to be assessed in relation to
views on original ownership, all Egalitarian Ownership states is that all
humans have a symmetrical claim to original resources.
The considerations motivating this view speak to raw materials
only, not to what human beings have made of them. Perhaps people
born into a given society should not be favored in terms of access to its
achievements. 5 We return to this issue below, but it should be clear
that, say, an egalitarian standpoint of sorts on collective ownership has
simply no implications for how one thinks about redistributive questions
that arise about entities that would not exist without human interference.
The distinction between what "is just there" and what has been shaped
by humans is blurred, for example, for land that human beings have
wrested from the sea, or for natural gas in garbage deposits that can be
harnessed. But by and large, we understand well enough the idea of what
exists without human interference, but that too is a point to which we
return below.
We can now see how original ownership is relevant today. We seek
principles by which we may legitimately understand resources as belonging to groups or individuals. Our view entails that resources, including
land, ought to be seen as shared property unless principles of allocation
are justifiable to all who have a potential interest in their use. One form
of justification may draw on the distinction between natural resources
and other things; the more my labor is responsible for an object's existence (at any rate for its existence as that object),' 6 the more plausible is
my right to it. The original right of property over the earth is now best
seen as a right to have justified to us whatever principles of allocation
17
exist, in terms we could not reasonably reject.
14.
15.

See generally Honor6, supra note 11.
Yet an argument for that view would differ from the one presented here. See
generally CHILES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979).
16. The point of that qualification is to distinguish the statue from the clay from
which it is made. For that distinction, no creation ex nihilo needs to be assumed.
17. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 195-97 (1999) (discussing the notion of reasonable rejection). One might say that, while it does make sense
to ask about the original ownership of resources, originally, resources are unowned, and
their appropriation is not subject to moral considerations. Yet if it is granted that questions about pre-legal moral rights of individuals over resources qualify as meaningful, the
mere claim that resources are originally unowned does not remove them; one would then
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In the next step, we must differentiate among different conceptions
of Egalitarian Ownership. Such conceptions differ in terms of how they
understand the symmetry of claims individuals have to original resources.
There are, roughly, four types of ownership-status an entity may have: no
ownership; joint ownership, which we understand as ownership directed
by collective preferences; common ownership, in which the entity belongs
to several individuals, each equally entitled to using it within constraints;
and private ownership.
Joint and common ownership are differentiated by the package of
rights they provide owners against one another's claims. Common ownership is a right to use something that does not come with the right to
exclude other co-owners from also using it. If the Boston Common were
held as common ownership when it was used for cattle, all individuals
would have the right to decide how they would make use of the grazing
land. Each individual would have the right to feed their cattle on the
Boston Common according to his or her own tastes. Joint ownership, in
contrast, creates a wider set of rights. If the Common is held in joint
ownership, each individual use would be subject to a decision process to
be concluded to the satisfaction of each co-owner. Joint ownership
ascribes to each co-owner property rights as extensive as rights of private
ownership, except that others hold the same rights: each co-owner must
be satisfied on each form of use. 18
Thus, there are various interpretations of Egalitarian Ownership:
resources could be jointly owned, or commonly owned, or each person
could have private ownership of an equal package of the world's
have to ask these questions in terms of original acquisition of what has no property status,
rather than in terms of privatization of what is collectively owned. Either way, it will be
hard to eliminate the intuition that all of humanity has a symmetrical claim to resources.
This point is important because some might hesitate to endorse our starting point that
the earth has any sort of positive ownership status. But for our argument it makes no
difference if one starts with the assumption that the earth originally has no ownership
status.
One reason for rejecting the Common Ownership perspective is that it seems to
capture an obsession with ownership peculiar to particular cultures. In addition to the
point just made, one could respond to that by insisting that the global order within
which questions of ownership must be assessed is shaped by considerations of ownership;
it is by thinking through this ownership perspective that one arrives at the idea of common ownership of the earth. Another objection is that in certain cases of unowned property, we have different intuitions: the twenty-dollar bill on the ground belongs to whoever
finds it. Yet this is so because such cases are infrequent and deal with relatively minor
values. This stance fails for sacks of hundred-dollar bills, and we would want a better
story even about twenties if they appeared on trees only grown on some people's
property.
18. Risse, supra note 13, at 360. The only constraint against other owners permissible here might be a constraint on destruction of the land as useful resource; each person
could be required to bring no more than a certain number of cattle, if this condition is
justified by respect for other co-owners and the concern to avoid the infamous Tragedy of
the Commons.
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resources. On any of these interpretations, the ownership rights thereby
established would be pre-institutional, and in that sense, natural rights.
These conceptions, that is, all carve out a space of natural rights that
constrain any more specific form of property regime that might be developed. How are we to decide which of these conceptions (each of which,
once further detail is added, could be developed in different versions) is
the preferred interpretation of Egalitarian Ownership?
Political philosophers in the seventeenth century, such as Grotius,
Pufendorf, Selden, Filmer, and Locke, were involved in complex debates
about how best to interpret God's gift of the earth to humankind, and a
similar debate needs to be had now with regard to these different conceptions. 9 Since this theological route is no longer open to us, we must
instead base our decision on two factors. The first is the independent
plausibility of the conceptions themselves-that is, whether they
represent conceptions that are coherent with other strongly held moral
convictions. The second is the extent to which the conceptions can
claim to be good interpretations of the two intuitions motivating Egalitarian Ownership-that is, the intuition that natural resources are valuable
and needed for human activities, and the intuition that their existence is
no individual person's accomplishment.
We submit that, on these criteria, Common Ownership is the most
plausible conception. 2 ° We cannot offer a complete argument for this
proposal here. What we can offer, however, is elaboration on what common ownership means, what it entails, and why it should be preferred to
the other conceptions as an interpretation of Egalitarian Ownership.2 1
After the seventeenth century, when this topic was central to political
thought, too little has been written on collective ownership of the earth
for us to be able to resort to a well-established literature. The main point
of this study, however, is to establish a connection between immigration
and the standpoint of common ownership rights. If this standpoint is
accepted generally, such acceptance would then also create space for
debate about the details of the components of this account.
The core idea of common ownership that we endorse is that all coowners ought to have an equal opportunity to satisfy their needs to the
19. See TUCK, supra note 4, at 78-165 (enumerating various arguments regarding
how man comes to own property and its implications in the conduct of war); see generally
STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY: GROTIUS To HUME

(1991) (enumerating more arguments on how man comes to own property).
20. In capital letters, "Joint Ownership" and "Common Ownership" are names of
interpretations of Egalitarian Ownership and hence views about ownership of the earth,
whereas in small letters "joint ownership" and "common ownership" are general forms of
ownership of anything. We will continue to say that humanity "collectively" owns the
earth if the precise form of ownership does not matter.
21. See Risse, supra note 13, at 360-64 (offering supportive arguments for Common Ownership as the preferred conception of Egalitarian Ownership, by showing why
the other possible conceptions are independently problematic).
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extent that this turns on obtaining collectively owned resources. This
formulation turns on three elements. First, it emphasizes an equality of
status-all individuals, on this account, are co-owners. Second, it points
out that this equality of status concerns opportunities to use these
resources as means to the satisfaction of needs. There is, on this account,
no sense in which each co-owner would be entitled to control a specific
chunk of what is collectively owned, let alone to the support of others in
getting such a share. Finally, this formulation addresses only those needs
which can be satisfied with resources that are collectively owned. Nothing at all is said here about anything to which the original intuitions
motivating Egalitarian Ownership do not apply, including entities whose
existence is not independent of human activities.
To put all this in terms of the Hohfeldian rights terminology,2 2
common ownership rights must minimally include "liberty-rights"
accompanied 2by
what H.L.A. Hart calls a "protective perimeter" of
"claim-rights." 3 "To have a liberty-right is to be free of any duty to the
contrary," 2 4 and obviously, common ownership rights must include at
least rights of that sort; that is, no co-owner is under any duty to refrain
from using any of the resources of the earth. Were the co-ownership
status reducible to such rights, we would end up with the sort of ownership rights that apply in a Hobbesian state of nature. That is, while no
individual is under any duty to refrain from using resources in any way,
no individual is under any duty not to interfere with such use either, and
so nobody would be in any position to create claim-rights against others
(no matter how minimal) by privatizing commonly owned resources at
the exclusion of others.
But the symmetry of claims postulated by Egalitarian Ownership
demands more than mere liberty rights. After all, the intuitions supporting the latter are that external resources are simultaneously nobody's
accomplishment and needed by all humans. In light of these two points,
to count as an interpretation of Egalitarian Ownership, Common Ownership must guarantee some minimal access to resources, that is, impose
duties on others to refrain from interference with certain forms of use an
individual might apply to collectively owned resources. Otherwise some
individuals might legitimately be completely deprived of access to
resources.
We must therefore add that protective perimeter of claim-rights to
the liberty-rights, perimeters of a sort that for instance Grotius and Locke
22. See generally PETER JONES, RIGHTS 12-14 (1994) (explaining the basic categories of rights delineated by Wesley Hohfeld); see also WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON, AN
INTRODUCTION To RIGHTS 87-102 (2004) (discussing Hohfeldian rights and their
application); and Leif Wenar, The Nature of Rights, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (2005).
23. H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 162, 171 (1982).
24. JONES, supra note 22, at 17.
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acknowledge: Grotius argued that an individual may take from nature
what she needs for survival, and that others are not allowed to interfere
with this process, 25 whereas Locke grants much further-reaching pre-conventional property rights that arise through "mixing" one's labor with
We submit that enough mileage
what is originally collectively owned.
can be obtained from the original intuitions supporting Egalitarian Ownership to require that common ownership rights (for Common Ownership to serve as an interpretation of Egalitarian Ownership) be conceived
of as giving rise to moral rights to use enough resources to satisfy some
minimal set of human needs. On this analysis, no co-owner may justly
interfere with the actions of another to the extent that they serve to satisfy basic needs-a position roughly similar to that taken by Grotius.2 7
We do not think these intuitions ought to be pressed beyond that. Equal
Division and Joint Ownership, in particular, both press these intuitions
further, and thus too far: no requirements of actual equality in one's
share in originally collectively owned resources, or participation in a collective decision-making process emerge from these intuitions. Again, to
the extent that common ownership does capture an equality of status, it
is merely an equality of opportunity to satisfy one's basic needs to the
extent that those turn on collectively owned stuff.
One more right must be added to the bundle of rights captured by
Common Ownership. Within a pre-institutional state of nature, where
the level of technology and organization is minimal, liberty rights to
external resources plus a protective perimeter of claim rights would plausibly guarantee individuals an equal opportunity to satisfy their needs to
the extent that this turns on obtaining collectively owned resources.
However, we must also make sure that individuals' co-owner status still
can be maintained once individuals have left behind this state of nature
and started to live under more complex institutional arrangements,
including complex property conventions. The development of such
arrangements-in particular, of course, the state system-makes it a difficult task to say just what common ownership amounts to. After all,
living in such arrangements means living in sophisticated economies in
which nothing much could be done without external resources, but in
25. See BUCKLE, supra note 19, at 35-36 (people may take what they need for
survival but to take from someone is unjust).
26. Id. at 151. There is no need to elaborate on these historical figures since they
only serve illustrative purposes here.
27. See BUCKLE, supra note 19, at 1-52. Locke, again, grants much further-reaching natural rights to property than acquisition for the purposes of satisfying needs. See
generally SREENIVASAN, supra note 12 (for the proposition that there are well-known
problems with Locke's expansive view of natural rights as encompassing more than just
need-based property acquisition). Locke's proposal also gets little support from the intuitions behind Egalitarian Ownership (since it argues for natural rights that go much further than these intuitions could support). We mention Locke here merely for illustrative
purposes.
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which most of what has economic value comes attached with special entitlements in a manner in which external resources do not. After all, at this
stage of human history, it is implausible to think of natural resources as if
they were mostly unclaimed. Resources are enmeshed in a web of legal
and moral patterns of property rights, at both the national and international levels. The moral status bestowed by Common Ownership, then,
must be able to survive this transition to more specific forms of property
regime.
Despite the expected difficulties in spelling out what this will
amount to, we think this transition is possible. Indeed, the notion of
Common Ownership will be able to provide some critical analysis of
what form of property regimes may be possible. We may say-in addition to what has come before-that property conventions must, on this
conception, be adopted such that the rights of co-owners are preserved in
the transition from pre-legal to legal society. In particular, we argue, the
transition must be made in such a way that co-owners do indeed maintain an equal opportunity to satisfy their needs to the extent, of course,
that this turns on obtaining collectively owned resources.
To put this into Hohfeldian terminology, co-owners have immunity
from being placed under living arrangements that create highly differential opportunities of that sort. This immunity amounts to a standing
demand that individuals' moral status as equal co-owners be protected
regardless of what particular property arrangements are adopted across
the globe. Common Ownership is a relatively weak notion of collective
ownership. It implies that co-owners who unilaterally use resources do
not owe compensation merely because others do not, or exploit certain
resources others fail to find where they live. It does not imply that individuals receive an equal share of resources, and that others have a duty to
help provide this share, nor does it imply that a collective decision making process is required to do anything with resources. Still, Common
Ownership is a conception of Egalitarian Ownership, and its collective
aspect must be meaningful. It does require that use of collectively owned
resources abide by constraints that ensure each co-owner's status is
respected.
For the remainder of this study, we assume that Common Ownership is the preferred interpretation of Egalitarian Ownership. While we
have not discussed Equal Division and Joint Ownership in any depth, we
hope that at least a prima facie case for this view has been made. It
should be noted that Joint Ownership is already a tremendously strong
view (and would, as far as immigration is concerned, have much more
demanding consequences than Common Ownership), whereas Equal
Division actually leads to the same proposal as far as immigration is concerned (as we will point out again at the relevant moment below).
Once we acknowledge that the earth is collectively owned, it follows
that immigration policies must be assessed with this ownership status in
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mind. How specifically to do this depends on what conception of Egalitarian Ownership is the preferred one. Common Ownership does not
grant entry to a country under just any circumstances. Still, certain
forms of use are obviously inconsistent with it. Suppose the population
of the United States shrank to two, other countries remaining unaffected.
Suppose those two can control its borders by means of sophisticated electronics. Clearly others can demand entry (as this is an obvious case in
which their immunity from being placed into arrangements in which
their opportunities to satisfy their needs by accessing collectively owned
resources are equal is violated), and the perspective of original ownership
28
helps us understand why. In a manner parallel to the Lockean proviso,
Common Ownership gives individuals a claim to have exclusion justified
to them.
A special feature of the situation under which individuals can claim
to have exclusion justified to them is that the commonly owned area (the
earth, or anyway most of its land mass) is entirely divided up by states.
Co-owners born into one state may be denied entrance to the others (a
fact that like no other, statistically speaking, shapes life prospects),2 9
without having other areas to retreat to. It is under such conditions that
we must explore co-owners' claims to consideration. The establishment
of states and other political structures in which particular property conventions are accepted is not per se inconsistent with the liberty rights or
even the protective perimeter of claim rights that are part of the bundle
of common ownership rights introduced above; we must make sure,
however, that states do indeed abide by the immunity granted to individuals from living under arrangements in which their equal status of as coowners is undermined. We must ask then, for this immunity to be
respected, what are the conditions under which individuals can demand
permission to immigrate in virtue of being co-owners? To reverse the
perspective: under what conditions do people not need to share their
territory?
Yet before we pursue this question further we must address one issue
that may render this inquiry moot. Some have argued that it lies in the
nature of a just political relationship that there can be no barriers to
immigration. If so, there is no need to explore under what conditions
the sheer fact that somebody is a co-owner would give her a claim to
immigrate. Conversely, if there is nothing in the nature of a just political
community that excludes immigration constraints, our inquiry becomes
important. We assume a just political community is just in the liberal
28. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT § 27 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g 1980) (1690) (explaining that exclusion from the common right
is proper only where there is "enough, and as good" for others).
29. See BRANCO MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL AND
GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2005) (supporting the proposition that inequality among countries
is much larger than inequality within states).
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sense. While other views require different ways of assessing the question
of whether features of justice exclude immigration restrictions, we choose
to engage with the liberal view not simply because we are sympathetic to
it, but also because its compatibility with immigration restrictions has
recently mustered considerable discussion. Liberalism is committed to
moral equality of all persons; it is this commitment that has been used to
argue that immigration restrictions are at odds with liberal justice. If
such an argument is accurate, then it appears our present paper is simply
unnecessary; we have no need to inquire about specific rights to immigration based on considerations of originalownership if a general and universal version of this right exists.
The best-developed version of this argument is presented by Joseph
Carens. 3° Liberalism, Carens notes, condemns the use of morally arbitrary facts about persons to justify inequalities; examples of these facts are
race, sex, and ethnicity.3 1 A political community that treated people differently on the basis of such features would be illiberal and unjust. Yet
citizenship seems as arbitrary as any of those factors. None of us chose
our place of birth, and we deserve neither advantages nor disadvantages
for it. Carens compares the existence of states to medieval feudalism.
Restricting immigration, on this view, is as offensive as other, perhaps
more obvious cases of injustice because it differentiates rights based upon
one's origins. 32 To complement this argument, Carens offers a cosmopolitan reading of Rawls, according to whom, the Original Position used
to derive principles of justice is extended globally." Given the contingent nature of borders, it would be inconsistent to limit applications of
the Original Position to states. Carens concludes that, from within an
extended Original Position, we would accept principles guaranteeing the
freedom to move across borders.3 4
30. See Joseph Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REv.
POL. 251 (1987) [hereinafter Carens, Aliens and Citizens]; see also BRUCE ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE

(1980);

MICHAEL DUMMETT, ON IMMIGRATION

AND REFUGEES (2001); TERESA HAYTER, OPEN BORDERS: THE CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION CONTROLS (2000); Joseph Carens, Migration and Morality: A Liberal-Egalitarian Perspective, in FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL
MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 25 (Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin eds.,
1992) [hereinafter Carens, Migration and Morality]; Chandran Kukathas, The Case for
Open Immigration, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS, supra note 9, at
207; Roger Nett, The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free Movement of
People on the Face of the Earth, 81 ETHICS 212 (1971); and Mark Tushnet, Immigration
Policy in LiberalPolitical Theory, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 147 (Warren F. Schwartz
ed., 1995).
31. Carens, Aliens and Citizens, supra note 30, at 252.
32. Id; see also Carens, Migration and Morality, supra note 30, at 26-27 (elaborating on the feudal metaphor).
33. Carens, Aliens and Citizens, supra note 30, at 261-62; see also BEITZ, supra
note

15;
34.

and THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS

(1989).

Carens, Aliens and Citizens, supra note 30, at 262.
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We may respond to this argument, briefly, by noting that we disagree with Carens's interpretation of Rawls. 35 Some readers of Rawls,
including Carens, view him as developing a form of moral argument
intended to apply to all forms of human interaction in which benefits
and burdens are created. 36 On this analysis, Rawls's original position is a
device whose moral relevance is not limited to the context of the nationstate; if something is demanded by the original position domestically, it
must similarly be morally demanded by the original position elsewhere,
including, notably, the realm of international politics. This interpretation, we think, ignores the specifically political character of Rawls's arguments regarding the original position. We read Rawls's arguments here
as giving a justification for political coercion, rather than a blanket
approach to moral and political evaluation.
We can be brief with our discussion of Rawls' scholarship, since we
have discussed these issues elsewhere in greater depth. We should note,
however, that the intuitive appeal of Carens's position persists even if
Rawlsian thought is ignored. Carens's argument, at heart, is one from
moral arbitrariness. What is arbitrary, on this account, should not be
permitted to ground a difference in life chances. This argument has considerable force. It does not, however, seem to us sufficient to ground a
general right to immigration.
Although Carens is correct that moral equality cannot stop at the
border, this does not mean shared citizenship is a morally irrelevant factor such as race or ethnicity. While shared citizenship has arisen in a
manner for which individuals deserve neither credit nor blame and is in
that sense arbitrary,this does not mean it is morally irrelevant. A border
marks something of moral importance, an area of shared liability to a
community. The state can do powerful things to those living within its
borders that it cannot do to others, and the special demands on the justifiability of its institutions and measures vis-A.-vis those subject to its
authority create a morally relevant relationship among its subjects. To
use an example, it is one thing for the United States to prevent a
Torontonian from moving to Boston and quite another for the United
States to prevent a Buffalonian from moving to Boston. The latter form
of restriction requires more justification, simply in virtue of the fact that
the Buffalonian is already part of the community of persons living under
United States legal coercion. This conclusion persists, moreover, even if
citizenship in Canada or the United States is regarded as utterly arbitrary.
Moral equality does not require equal political rights, and so does not
require political equality. What moral equality means depends on the
political structures shared by individuals. So shared citizenship is not like
35. JOHN RAWLs, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999) (disagreeing with Carens' interpretation of the application of the Original Position).
36. Carens, Aliens and Citizens, supra note 30, at 255-59.
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shared status under feudalism. The right to mobility is not an implication of moral equality. Liberal
principles of justice are not inconsistent
37
with immigration constraints.
We hope this is sufficient to rebut Carens's argument for a general
and universal right to immigration. We would emphasize, however, that
we take no specific position here on the proper interpretation of global
justice more generally. Our argument is intended to be compatible with
a wide variety of positions-including some that might find independent
rights and restrictions on immigration from other factors, including consideration of global distributive justice. We do not think of our argument, that is, as the only valid pattern of argumentation regarding
international justice and immigration. Our argument at present is
intended to ask only what forms of immigration restrictions might
emerge from consideration of original ownership of the earth. It is to
this task that we now return.
What, then, are the conditions under which common ownership
rights require that individuals can demand entry in virtue of being coowners? Suppose inhabitants claim that their land is too crowded for
them to take in more people. This argument is generally buttressed by a
claim about a specific activity immigration would undermine, so that a
claim of overuse tends to be a claim of overuse-with-regard-to-a-certainpurpose. "We are," it is said, "too crowded as it is; more immigrants
would destroy the distinctive character of our state." While these points
(overcrowding per se vs. overcrowding in view of a purpose) are often
conflated, we must keep them separate for analytical purposes.
What is behind such assertions is an idea that is presumably often
misused but that, under the view developed here, has a valid core. As we
saw above, when a system of states is erected in collectively owned space,
the co-owners' equal status must be preserved, as far as their equal opportunities for access to collectively owned resources is concerned. Of
course, economies at this stage of history operate in such ways that only
few people make a living direcdy by appropriating or handling resources
taken from the common pool. This implies that, within societies, individual claims to collectively owned resources might well be satisfied in
ways other than by granting them an equal opportunity of access to
external resources. (Common ownership claims in this way might support a basic welfare system.) But the erection of a state system must also
be justifiable to all co-owners in the sense that their opportunities of
access to external resources, at least to the extent needed to satisfy their
basic needs, must remain equal regardless of which state they live in. Let
37. Cf Blake, supra note 6. The existence of states must also be justifiable to those
who do not belong to a given state. But here the point is to insist that special demands of
justifiability arise with regard to citizens, not that all features of the state and their existence must only be justified to members of the state.
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us see, then, whether we can make sense of an idea of overuse and
underuse that helps us capture the equality of status as co-owners that
must be preserved by the erection of a state system.
To make sense of the idea that co-owners are overusing commonly
owned resources (and so would not need to admit more people) or
underusing them (so we would have to), one needs a measure of the value
for human purposes of all commonly owned resources located in an area.
Such a measure would not just be concerned with square mileage and
thus population density. After all, its purpose is to evaluate claims that a
group uses more or less than what they should be using qua co-owners,
arguments deployed to deny or demand entry. Yet areas with the same
population density may differ dramatically otherwise: one may consist of
arable land (with an evenly spread population), another mostly of desert
(with the population crowded in a small fertile area); one may come with
lots of minerals, another be depleted of them; one may be adjacent to the
sea and include many navigable rivers, another landlocked. Such a measure would have to include not merely the size of the land, but also
resources like minerals and water, and the quality of the location as captured by a range of biophysical factors. In short, this measure would
have to evaluate a region's overall usefulness for human activities. It
needs to allow for comparisons of sets of such factors, which are most
straightforwardly accomplished by a one-dimensional measure, something like an aggregated world-market value. Since we want to use this
measure to say that one area, plus its resources and biophysical parameters, is taken up to a larger or smaller extent than others, all-things-considered comparability is essential. (But keep in mind that, while this
measure would have to capture all that is collectively owned, it must also
be limited to capturing what is indeed collectively owned: entities that
only exist because of human activities are not to be included.)
World-market values would reflect demand for commodity sets in
light of supply constraints. Prices reflect the usefulness of entities for
human purposes given the state of technology and limitations on availability. This does not mean there could be no other sense in which the
entities being assessed have value; nor that may those who possess
resources do with them entirely as they please; nor that all of them would
be for sale. Yet none of this is true for objects that are usually priced by
market value. Using world-market prices also offers a simple way of
reflecting technological constraints. Suppose we discover minerals far
below the surface, but do not have the technology to extract them. Such
resources would enter the overall value of the set of resources to be
assessed in a discounted way. The presence of resources we cannot bring
into circulation will not, and should not, create much pressure to allow
for more immigration; on our account, however, the presence of
resources that happen not to be in flow but are part of the stock to which
a country has a ready access will and should.
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Some of this pricing will be novel: biophysical factors shaping the
usefulness for human purposes of geographical locations are not normally
priced. In an optimistic mode, one might think that humanity has so far
had no trouble adding more entities to the set of those with a price
ticket. However, recent reflections on the desirability to broaden the
U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (which measure economic
activities in the U.S. economy) to include activities and assets not immediately tied to market transactions and thus not presently captured in
those accounts have revealed difficulties in doing so, difficulties of a sort
we cannot address here. At any rate, no such measure is in use at this time.
Neither can we turn to economists for well-established methods of
extending pricing in this manner, nor can we turn to the biophysical
sciences for candidates of such a measure whose suitability for our purpose we might ponder. All we can do for now is explore the conceptual
possibility of such a measure, formulate some desiderata, and contrast
our proposal to use such a measure to assess demands to entry with other
proposals. Again, sometimes the task of philosophy is to argue that
something is needed for which the work must be done in the sciences.3 8
One might worry, though, that the proposal to use market values to
gauge whether or not a state is using more or less than an appropriate
share of the earth's resources faces the problem that market valuations
themselves emerge from some initial set of entitlements which we do not
know are or were fair. In the first instance, we are thinking about our
proposal as applying the world roughly as it is-that is, with roughly the
current state structure in place and with roughly the sorts of supply and
demand pressures in place. It is to states as they are that we would like to
say that they should add this perspective to their manner of thinking
about immigration policy. At the same time, it is quite conceivable, even
likely, that additional considerations would have to be introduced to rectify past injustice that has shaped how the value for human purposes of
external resources comes about through the valuation process adopted.
But without actually having a valuation process at hand with regard to
which this could be analyzed in detail, we can only note that some rectifying factor might well have to be added to that process.
For any state S, our measure would deliver an index Vs, measuring
the value of the collectively owned resources on S's territory, including
the biophysical conditions determining the usefulness of this territory for
human purposes. To assess the extent to which S's territory is used, one
would divide Vs by the number Ps of people in S. Vs/Ps is theper-capita
38.

See, e.g.,

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATURE'S NUMBERS: EXPANDING THE

NATIONAL ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS TO INCLUDE THE ENVIRONMENT
NATURE'S NUMBERS]

and

ING NONMARKET ACCOUNTS
THE MARKET]

(1999) [hereinafter

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BEYOND THE MARKET: DESIGNFOR THE UNITED STATES

(2005) [hereinafter

BEYOND

(enumerating different efforts to broaden national economic accounting

beyond market activities).
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use rate of commonly-owned resources on S's territory.3 9 Vs/Ps includes
resources that are not actually in circulation (not literally used), such as
unmined minerals and unextracted oil (possibly suitably discounted). Yet
the point is to have a measure of what is at a society's disposal, broadly
speaking, that is, actual as well as potential use, and we will address below
how to handle situations in which a society is in no position, or has
chosen not, to extract resources feeding into its use rate." ° The point is
to have a measure of a stock of resources that takes into account how
straightforwardly that stock could be transformed into a flow of resources
if desired, rather than a measure of only the current flow.
The territory of S is relatively underused(or simply underused) if Vs/
Ps is bigger than the average of these values across states (in which case
the average person in that area uses a resource bundle of higher value
than the average person in the average country), and that it is relatively
overused (or simply overused) if this value is under average. If Vs/Ps is
above average, co-owners elsewhere have a pro tanto claim to immigration. (The "pro tanto" character of this claim will be discussed below.)
Otherwise they do not. This, we submit, is what is required by Common Ownership to preserve all individuals' status as co-owners in the
presence of a system of states.4" While thinking about immigration is
not commonly guided by such ideas, one can envisage a philosophically
astute U.N. Secretary General commissioning a committee to devise such
a measure to assess the scope of transnational obligations, including
immigration.
Since we are talking about rights entailed by common ownership of
the earth, their satisfaction would have to assume the specific shape of
allowing for immigration. The object of ownership is the earth itself,
and what is at stake is how this physical location can be divided up given
that it is held in common. Conceivably the world's population would
agree that people who underuse their territory make payments (say,
development aid) to others; but what cannot be reconciled with this
ownership status is that they could pay off others, although those would
prefer to exercise their right to immigrate. They have that right in virtue
of being co-owners, and while they may decide to waive it for such pay39. We think of Ps only in terms of counting people. It would be possible to
extend this assessment to animal life or the environment if one has independent reasons

for wanting to be inclusive in this way.
40.

But see THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COS-

MOPOLITAN

RESPONSIBILITIES

AND

REFORMS

196-97(2002) (according to Pogge's

"Global Resources Dividend" concept, a society sitting on its resources would not be
taxed). Such resources would be included in our measure.
41. One should note here that Equal Division would also lead to this view. We
have argued above that Common Ownership is preferable to Equal Division as a conception of Egalitarian Ownership. See also Risse, supra note 13, at 349-76 (arguing that
there are internal problems with Equal Division). But for present purposes, it is useful to
know that this conception would support the same view on immigration.
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ments, it remains their prerogative to do so. 4 2 This point also allows for
a link between collective ownership and claims to political membership.
Under-users have two ways of responding to would-be immigrants: they
can relinquish territory, allowing for the founding of other political entities, or they can admit them to their territory. The latter will generally
be the more straightforward and desirable course of action, as far as the
states themselves are concerned. In that case, prudential and moral reasons will speak against
keeping immigrants systematically outside of the
43
political community.
Let us compare relative overuse and underuse as a device for assessing demands to entry to two other such measures. First, there is an absolute notion of over-population, discussed by Michael Dummett. 4 Such
a measure decides on requests for entry by asking whether a territory can
support more people. More needs to be said about what counts as "supporting." Is it enough if more people could survive there? Is the assessment made simply through reference to the current population's
standard of living? Or is there yet another account? No matter how
42. See supra pp. 148-49 (saying that, internal to states, it is not the case that
individual claims to actual access to originally commonly owned resources are acknowledged, and granting that their co-ownership status could be acknowledged in different
ways, which, we suggested, delivers an argument for basic welfare services within states).
So in that case, then, presumably certain co-owners' preferences for actual access to
resources would be defeated. Why then could one not defeat the claims of outsiders to
entry by paying them off? Obviously, it will not in general be true that all citizens of a
state have actually chosen this arrangement, so what then is the difference between internal defection and external demands for entry that would allow paying off those interested
in the former, but not those interested in the latter? The difference is that, in the internal
case, a lot more is at stake for the state as such. Acting on such preferences (which would,
at any rate, be rather hard short of granting actual secession) would easily undermine the
functionality of the state. This would arguably give the state a much stronger reason not
to do so than what it could muster to deny requests for immigration (even though, of
course, at least some requests for secession might well be legitimate and might have to be
granted).
Granting requests to immigration would have no such severe consequences, particularly if the state, as we argue below, can exercise a certain degree of discretion in deciding
whom to admit. Deeper issues about state legitimacy and secession lurk, but there is no
need to pursue them here. See generally PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAw (Robert C.
Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002) (for the relevant aspects of property involved). In this
regard, ownership of the earth is much like ownership of objects in a legal system. A
might sell B her car, but B could not take it and leave its market value without A's
consent. A owns the car, not a monetary equivalent. There are exceptions to this: if B
can only survive by breaking into A's cabin and has no way of contacting A, B would be
allowed to do so and would then have to fix the damage. Thinking about this easily gets
complicated, but all we need is that a claim to a specific thing (the physical location
"earth") is the essence of the (commonly held) property claim at stake here.
43. Gradual integration (such as ascension from visa-holder to permanent resident
and from there to citizen) is consistent with this view. Such people would not be guest
workers, but actual immigrants.
44. Michael Dummett, Immigration, 10 REs PUBLICA 115, 119 (2004).
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these questions are answered, absolute measures are irrelevant to the common ownership standpoint. My status as co-owner is not violated if
entry is denied to areas that are relatively overused already. However, if
all parts of the earth are crowded to an extent an absolute measure would
classify as higher than what those regions can support, Common Ownership may entitle people to entry in areas that are less overcrowded than
where they came from. Such areas are thus relatively underused although
absolutely overused. I can demand of others that they admit me, even if
they are in dire straits, if my situation is worse. Common Ownership, or
at any rate, the immunity that is relevant for our current purposes, is
concerned with the relative standing of co-owners when a system of states
has been erected in commonly owned space. Comparisons have to be
made in terms of proportionateusage of areas (considering their value for
human purposes) relative to other areas.
45
Contrast this measure with the account given by Cavallero.
Cavallero observes that countries are subject to emigration and immigration pressure; for a given country there may be some who want to leave 46it
(for roughly economic reasons), and others who want to immigrate.
(Some such sets may be empty.) Some countries will be under positive
immigrationpressure: on balance, proportionately more people want to
immigrate into these countries than emigrate-"proportionately," that is,
in a manner that factors in differences in population size. Other countries will be under negative immigration pressure. They generate, rather
than attract,immigration pressure. These are countries that, on balance,
more people want to leave. Cavallero proposes that countries generating
immigration pressure have a claim to support. Countries that attract
immigration pressure need to allow for immigration or give aid to
decrease immigration47 pressure by making it more appealing for people to
stay where they are.
According to Cavallero, the normative significance of immigration
pressure is that it indicates inequality of opportunity.48 A legal system
should not create bars to equal opportunity on the basis of arbitrary traits
like nation of birth. International law constitutes a legal system that confers on states the right to restrict immigration. Unless those restrictions
are balanced by improving opportunities in worse-off countries, international law creates bars to equal opportunity on the basis of nation of
45.

Eric Cavallero, An Immigration-PressureModel of Global DistributiveJustice, 5

POL. PHIL. & ECON. 97 (2006).
46. The expression "want to immigrate" refers to hypothetical preferences. Cavallero assesses immigration pressure assuming that visa applications are possible and means
for relocation are provided. See id at 107-08 (explaining underlying assumptions for
Cavalero's immigration pressure calculus).

47.
48.

Id.
See generally id.
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birth.4 9 In the background is the "Cosmopolitan Premise," that
"[o] ngoing institutions of international law should not systematically disadvantage anyone on the basis of involuntary national citizenship or
national origin." 5° Since everybody is at least indirectly subject to international law, it must not discriminate on morally arbitrary grounds such
as nation of birth.
The difference between this proposal and ours turns on the "Cosmopolitan Premise." With this Premise as his starting point, Cavallero
thinks about acceptable demands to entry in terms of preferences for
immigration. 51 It seems to us, however, that the starting point should be
an importantly modified premise, namely that "[o]ngoing institutions of
international law should not systematically disadvantage anyone [in a
morally unacceptable way] on the basis of involuntary national citizenship or national origin." 52 People who share a citizenship or national
origin may in principle create a situation in which international law is
justified in disadvantaging them, just as individuals can behave in ways
that make it acceptable for the law to disadvantage them. To exclude this
possibility, the Cosmopolitan Premise should state that what is ruled out
is morally unacceptable disadvantage. But once this addition has been
made, we are led to the common-ownership standpoint and from there
to the view we are proposing. (Notice that Cavallero allows for payments
in lieu of allowing for immigration, 5 3 whereas on our proposal this cannot be done against the would-be immigrants' preferences.)
This discussion makes clear that our account might not track preferences for immigration, not even hypothetical preferences people may
have if practical obstacles to immigration are resolved. To the extent that
immigration pressure is generated by income differences, measures of relative overuse and underuse cannot track such pressure if the strength of
the economy is insignificantly correlated with resource-richness. This
strikes us as unproblematic but serves to illustrate the implications of our
proposal. We grant that there are independent duties of aiding other
countries in building institutions. Nonetheless, our account does not
grant preferences that stem from income differences between nations' status as legitimate claims to demands of entry.
Let us discuss some worries about our proposal. To begin with, one
may question the sheer possibility of measuring relative overuse or
underuse in a meaningful way. 54 Again, no such measure is in use. The
49. Id. at 100.
50. Id. at 98.
51. See generally id.
52. See id. at 98.
53. See id. at 107-08 (detailing the mechanism of the allowable anti-immigration
payment scheme).
54. The discussion in the following paragraphs draws on correspondence with Bill
Clark (Harvard University), Guenther Fischer (International Institute for Applied Sys-
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closest approximation that has been brought to our attention is a method
developed by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, which offers an inventory
of land resources and an evaluation of its biophysical potential, the socalled Agro-Ecological-Zones methodology.5" While any measure that
meets our purposes would have to play the role of a general "habitability
index," it is doubtful that biophysical factors can be assessed without
accounting for ("normalizing out") human activities (technology, culture
organization, etc.). To illustrate, consider the Netherlands. That area
became prime land by the innovation of the polder and a national unity
that created and controlled the polder-dikes.5 6 Previously, the Netherlands was a wasteland by any indicator assessing the value of resources
independently of human input. For any suitable measure, the Netherlands would have scored low at one time (prior to the construction of
polders and dikes), and high at another (afterwards), with no change in
its biophysical conditions. Such an effect would occur whenever the
value of a set of resources increases through intervention. To mention
another case, eradicating diseases like malaria decisively changes the value
for human purposes of whole regions.
As the illustration indicates, there is an ambiguity in this worry.
The worry may be that it is conceptually impossible to separate biophysical conditions from human contributions, or that if we applied such a
measure now we would evaluate bundles of resources that have already
been affected by human input. The former version fails: as the polder
and malaria cases suggest, it will generally be clear enough what the
human contributions have been. The more urgent concern is how they
should factor into evaluations. To make more precise the question we are
asking, recall that the intuition behind Egalitarian Ownership is that
resources came into existence unattached to any human entitlements.
But all we can derive from that intuition is that resources should be considered collectively owned; what ingenuity has added is not covered.
Unless we add another argument, whether, say, the Dutch overuse or
underuse their territory must be assessed relative to the value of resources
with human inventiveness entirely factored out, a task to be left to the
tems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria), B. L. Turner (Clark University), Thomas Parris
(ISciences, LLC, Ann Arbor), Robert Kates (Harvard University & Initiative on Science
and Technology for Sustainability), and Eric Lambin (University of Louvain). Many
thanks to them. For a discussion of ways to account for activities and assets not immediately tied to market transactions, see generally BEYOND THE MARKET and NATURE'S
NUMBERS, supra note 38. Many thanks to Katharine Abraham, Christopher Mackie,
William Nordhaus, and Edward Kokkelenberg, who edited those texts.
55. See Int'l Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Global Agro-Ecological Zones
(Global-AEZ), http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm?sb=6 (last visited
Jan. 19, 2009).
56. A polder is land below the sea level in a location from which the sea has been
drained away.
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biophysical sciences and the ingenuity of econometricians. The Netherlands with its high population density would presumably emerge as a
highly overused area. Can a case be made that, perhaps in time, products
of human ingenuity should be added to the common stock? Are there
conditions under which such products are sufficiently like resources for all
of humanity to have a symmetrical claim to them?
To stay with the example, consider how the Dutch could block such
a claim. They might argue their predecessors could make their contributions only given their cultural background. What made polder-dikes
possible and rendered it feasible to maintain them was national unity and
stability within which the necessary skills could flourish. More generally,
it is because of specific social, legal, or political conditions that individuals or groups can improve commonly owned resources, or invent things
for which resources were necessary enablers (think of the whole area of
57
"intellectual property").
So the reason why the legacy of their predecessors (including the
complex social, legal, economic, and political world the Dutch have
developed over generations) should remain their collective property is not
that contemporary Dutchmen have a substantive desert-based claim to
that effect. It is, rather, the following two-stage argument: First, if commonly owned resources could be improved and other entities invented
only because of the specific culture in which their predecessors participated, then others who have not participated in that culture have not
acquired a claim to the value thereby added to the common stock. They
have not been relevantly connected to this process. Second, contemporary Dutchmen are relevantly connected to that process. 58 To begin
with, they are the contemporary participants in the culture that made the
earlier achievements possible and continues to maintain them (at least in
cases where there has been sufficient cultural and political continuity over
the last few centuries in which most of those improvements have been
made). Moreover, it is plausible that their predecessors would have
wanted them to be the beneficiaries of their achievements. Considerations about what is owed to the dead have recently been applied by Ridge
to reparations for past injustice. 59 Similar considerations hold for inheri57. External resources are enablers in trivial ways: the realization of ideas involves
materials in some form, and at any rate, external resources provide the background before
which human life unfolds to begin with.
58. One argument not open to us to make that case involves pointing to general
arguments for the existence of states. After all, this study assumes the legitimacy of states,
and our question is precisely how to think about the limitations of state sovereignty,
specifically the extent to which states can assert special ownership rights.
59. See Michael Ridge, Giving the Dead Their Due, 114 ETHICS 38, 42-45 (2003)
(suggesting that those who wronged a particular person or group owe a debt to the dead
which can be paid back through reparations to the descendents).
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tance. It is thus up to the current generation of Dutchmen to regulate
60
this legacy, and others have no claim to immigration based on it.
Yet it is easy to create doubts about the strongest version of the view
that contemporary Dutchmen have claims to all the value added by their
predecessors. (Notice that doubts about that view cannot just point to
possible weaknesses of contemporary Dutchmen's connection to the process in which value was added to commonly owned goods. After all, it is
part of the above argument that those who have not been participating in
that culture fail to be relevantly connected to the value-bestowing process. Their complete lack of connection makes it easy to show that contemporary Dutchmen have a stronger link to it.) One source of doubt is
that this argument makes it sound as if the Dutch had made their accomplishments in isolation. In actuality, there had been much interaction
with others, including colonial oppression that persisted for centuries.
But let us set aside such issues. To the extent that such interaction was
voluntary, it does not generate claims on the side of others. To the extent
that it was not, it may generate claims to compensation, whose existence,
however, would be orthogonal to our present concerns.
A second sort of doubt is more relevant. Regardless of how deserving of the added value the Dutch predecessors were on the basis of having added it, their acts cannot ground claims that resonate through the
ages to the exclusive benefit of relatively few heirs. The fact that others
could have added the increased value, and in due course would have, may
not undermine the claims of those who actually did so. But this fact
does weaken the claims of their offipring to the endurance of those entitlements. The point is similar to the objection to the first-occupancy
theory of acquisition: perhaps on a sensible understanding of "occupancy," first-comers can legitimately claim land. Their accomplishments
also prevent others from accomplishing the same, but that does not
undermine desert-based claims they have because of these accomplishments. But such occupation, regardless of circumstances, cannot ground
claims on account of their offspring at the exclusion of others. Employing a term of Waldron's, 6 1 the original claims are superseded in time.
What supersedes them is that with each generation there are more people
who have actually been barred from improving the external resources at
stake because others had already done so, a fact that evermore undermines the claims of heirs of the original improvers. Like the original
60. This argument does not bear on the question of how inheritance should be
regulated within a given country. On the contrary: the more one emphasizes the relevance of the background culture for the value added by the predecessors, the more there
will be pressure to discount the claims of outsiders, but the more there will also be pressure to let the current participants in the national culture as a whole be allowed to benefit
from the inheritance. See D.W. Haslett, Is InheritanceJustfied?, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
122 (1986).
61. See Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 24 (1992).
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value improvers, those heirs bar others from making those same accomplishments. Yet unlike them, they themselves are tied to the accomplishments (think of the polders) only by being offspring of those who had
originally made them.
This argument undermines the view that the relevance of national
culture for the predecessors' ability to add value to commonly owned
resources creates a special entitlement of that culture's current participants (certainly in its strongest version, in which those participants have
a claim to all value added). Nonetheless, it is a big step to the conclusion
that in time this added value becomes sufficiently like external resources
for all of humanity to have a symmetrical claim to it. It has often been
the case for major technological innovations of the last 150 years that
different people were working on them simultaneously. 62 If one of them
had not patented a product roughly when he did, somebody else would
have. But such ideas do not thereby become common property.
So neither would the Dutch have a convincing claim that the specific features of their culture necessary for the value added by their predecessors to commonly owned resources entitle them to all that value; nor
is there a plausible case that all such value turns into common property
because others would have provided it too. Instead, we are pointed to
some intermediate view on whose details we are not clear. One confronts
here a bewildering array of counterfactuals whose truth and relevance are
hard to assess. Yet sorting out what is sufficiently like external resources
to make it common property is central to our view. Different views on
what is commonly owned have varying implications for how much
immigration must be permitted. Still, if our standpoint is convincing,
the detailed resolution of this question can be left open for now, as this is
the initial articulation of this view. Having made clear what the complexities of resolving this question are, let us only briefly state what seems
to us a sensible, if incomplete, standpoint.
We hold that commonly owned resources that have been improved
by technology should be counted among the common property when
that technology has become readily available. So the polder-dikes should
be considered common property. The value of commonly owned
resources should be measured in a manner that incorporates the impact
of commonly available technology and other human factors that could
(and in due course would) have been provided by others. At the same
time, artifacts, ideas, legal, economic, political, and social practices, and
other entities for which such external resources have been, in an intuitive
sense, mere enablers should not be counted among the common propSee generally DAVID P. BILLINGTON & DAVID P. BILLINGTON JR., POWER,
FoRM: ENGINEERS AND THE MAKING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(2006) (showing the various individuals contributing to engineering breakthroughs, with
emphasis on pairs and groups working on concurrent discoveries).
62.

SPEED,

AND
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erty. So, say, the value of the Dutch economy beyond the value of
improved common resources should not be counted common property.
Some arbitrariness in drawing the line is inevitable. Nevertheless, there is
nothing incoherent about drawing it, and again, disagreement about
where to draw it would be internal to our standpoint. (Anybody who
endorses a distinction between choices and circumstances encounters a
similar problem.) At a more practical level, implementing our proposal
will require a certain degree of global coordination, and just what is considered common property might have to be left to a political process that
could be embedded into such coordination.
A final point on this discussion: it is also possible that intervention
lowers the value for human purposes of certain resources (deforestation,
pollution). Following the same sort of argument, the offspring of those
who caused such damage would not be held responsible for it. They
would not have to allow for more immigration than demanded by the
current per capita use rate because the value of the resources occupied by
them is lower than it would be had certain mischief not been done in the
past.
Above, we said complaints of overcrowding are often claims of
overuse-with-regard-to-a-purpose. In that spirit, one may object, internal
to the common ownership perspective, that our proposed measure does
not adequately develop that perspective. Appropriate use, if not numerically proportionate use, turns on what is done with resources. Legitimate
ownership, one may say, has a purpose: the development of communities
with certain features. What matters about common ownership on such a
view is that it might license what we call "arguments from preservation."
Such arguments insist that states should accomplish goal X that can no
longer be accomplished without immigration constraints. Whether the
common ownership standpoint does license such arguments (granting
that people need not share their territory) depends on whether these
goals are morally acceptable. Prima facie plausible candidates for X
include the preservation of a certain culture, or its purity, a certain economic or technological standing (human and physical capital and knowhow; a wage-structure that can be preserved only by regulating labor
markets), or a political system (where, for example, modest inequality
may depend on keeping the numbers of unskilled workers low). While
often such arguments are based on self-interest, we may reinterpret them
in their most morally plausible lights as insisting that there is some independent value to preserving X.
One can criticize such arguments on internal and external grounds.
Criticizing them on internal grounds means to suggest that X itself stands
in tension with immigration constraints devised to protect X. Criticizing
them on external grounds is to suggest that preserving X is not worth the
costs involved by imposing constraints. More could be said since arguments from preservation are contentious; but what matters is that, far
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from capturing this standpoint, such arguments generally do not give
proper weight to the common ownership standpoint. On the contrary,
concerns about the reach of arguments from preservation motivate
inquiries into implications of this standpoint in the first place. A culture
shared only by two people occupying a vast territory might be worth
preserving, but such occupancy would not count as appropriate use from
the common ownership standpoint. Preservation arguments do not capture the common ownership standpoint; rather, that standpoint constrains their use. One may grant that what resources are used for must
enter the discussion-alas in a supplementary, not a conclusive, manner.
The burden of proof is on those who wish to overrule implications of the
common-ownership standpoint by granting certain cultures more
resources than numerically they ought to have. After all, the common
ownership standpoint does provide people outside of an underused territory with a claim to entry, and it takes more than appeals to self-interest
to defeat it.
Since the main source of the demand for entry is the common ownership status, receiving countries have some discretion to choose the
applicants who suit them. A country with a strong social system that is
underusing its territory would be within its rights to choose people with
professional credentials; a country with demographic problems to choose
young applicants or those deemed likely to have several children; and a
culturally homogenous country to give preference to applicants who
share crucial elements of its culture, or are willing to adjust to it. Yet the
common ownership standpoint also puts constraints on such discretion.
First of all, other things being equal, applicants from countries that are
overusing their resources have priority. These are the ones who are not
getting their share of commonly owned resources. Second, immigration
policy should also take into account a duty of aid that applies to rich
countries with full ability to exploit resources to countries lacking that
ability. Just how immigration policy should do so is a difficult empirical
question we cannot address; sometimes immigration supports development because it decreases population pressure or generates remittances;
but there is also a "brain-drain" problem if those who leave are the most
valuable for development. We would merely like to assert that a country
does not have unlimited discretion in admitting immigrants. It matters
where those immigrants come from. At any rate, if not enough applicants meet the criteria of the admitting country, that country, as long as
it is underusing its resources, would have to choose from among the
63
others.
63. There may be reasons why certain immigration preferences are unacceptable
on other grounds. Certain minorities might deserve protection of a form that would
entail that some people have to be admitted. Considerations of this sort can be understood as preservation arguments of a particular sort as well, and if they are present, the
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As a case study for how preservation arguments might be weighed
against considerations drawing on Common Ownership, consider the
"White Australia" policy.6" "White Australia" is a term for the Australian immigration policy in place throughout the first half of the twentieth
century (to some extent longer).6 5 Its goal was to exclude non-whites.66
Notice that normally land within a society is not uniformly densely
populated; there often are relatively under-populated areas (American
Great Plains, Canadian Northlands, Australian Outback). Arguments
from preservation minimally require a showing that the society as a
whole is too densely packed to allow the continuation of the project in
question. This is rarely so; immigration into under-populated areas is
frequently compatible with maintaining the national project. The common ownership standpoint generates pressure to permit such immigration. We agree with Michael Walzer, who stated that "White Australia"
claimed more territory than was acceptable. 6 7 While perhaps the urbanized east coast of Australia could legitimately seek to develop the project
of "whiteness," the largely uninhabited Outback could not.6 8 (On the
"perhaps," see the second point below.) "White Australia," Walzer
69
stated, "could survive only as Little Australia."
Note two instructive points. First, under-populated areas of nations
appear to have fewer grounds to exclude immigrants than urbanized
areas. This is often the opposite of what potential immigrants desire.
Immigrants have a tendency to regard their port of entry as the default
location to settle down. These are often cities where recent arrivals can
more easily obtain services and establish communities. 70 Some nations
have programs of advanced immigration status for those willing to settle
in uninhabited areas. (Canada seeks to place immigrants in rural
areas. 7 1) Our analysis suggests that this is legitimate. While the common ownership standpoint does create pressure on countries that
overall weighing would involve common-ownership considerations and different forms of
preservation arguments.
64. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY

46-48 (1983).

65. Id. at 46.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 47.
68. See id.(noting the idea that white Australia's claim to all uninhabited land is
not legitimate in the absence of use. Their options are to surrender their claim to all the
land to preserve "whiteness" or surrender their "whiteness" to maintain a claim on the
land.).
69. Id. at 47.
70. See generally THEORIES OF MIGRATION (Robin Cohen ed., 1996) (answering
the question of why immigrants settle in urban areas).
71. See James McCarten, Rural Areas Suffer Lack of Diversity: Immigration to Cities
Leaves Countryside Starvedfor Skilled Labour, Census Figures Show, VANCOUVER SUN, Jan.
22, 2003, at B5 (explaining that more than 94% of Canadian immigrants settled in
urban areas in the 1990s; in response, the Canadian government created "nominee pro-
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underuse resources to allow for more immigration, such countries are ipso
facto within their rights to channel immigration to less-populated areas
(provided this does not involve independently objectionable measures).
The second point is that projects such as "White Australia" may
themselves be impermissible. As we insisted when introducing arguments from preservation, not just any project deserves adequate space to
develop. We may only be compelled to accept principles of distribution
of land that give space to communities committed to justice. We do not
face the same moral pull to allow room for racism. "White Australia" is
impermissible because Australia was never purely white; it took place
within a multiracial society where the Aborigine population was severely
disadvantaged. Aborigines could have launched a preservation argument
of their own, insisting that individuals partaking of their culture are not
properly respected in a state that asks obedience of them while admitting
only whites.
Our discussion has left open various questions, specifically the following four. First, suppose a population does not underuse its resources
but is concentrated in one corner, although the remainder is inhabitable.
The general case is a population that does not underuse resources but
decides to leave large shares unused. Do others have a claim to entry?
Second, suppose a population underuses its resources because certain
resources play no role in their economy. These may be resources they are
even unwilling to trade. (Maybe their religion forbids the required digging.) Or perhaps they value resources in a manner different from the
accepted measure, and according to their measure they do not underuse
their territory. Do others have a claim to entry? Third, one may ask
whether our account does justice to the symmetry of the ownership
claims or leaves too much to luck. It is by luck that some live in areas
that many want to enter and others do not. Should these effects not be
minimized, in the sense that either those living in favored regions cannot
ever reject people, or at least that their presence at such locations must be
subject to a lottery? Finally, one may worry that our proposal sets perverse incentives for environmental and population policy. One way of
ensuring that one is not underusing resources is to waste them; another is
to increase one's population.
To illustrate the first concern, recall our discussion of "White Australia" and set aside any problems that may arise for Aboriginals. What if
there had been sufficiently many whites for a territory much larger than
the Eastern seaboard, although that is where they lived? There are many
reasons why populations want to concentrate in one corner of their territory: they may want to preserve resources for future use; leave buffers
between themselves and their neighbors; or hang on to additional terrigrams" to offer expedited residency to skilled immigrants willing to settle in underpopulated areas).
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tory that has been theirs historically. If they are not underusing
resources, their decision to use them in such ways is acceptable from a
common ownership standpoint. This holds so long as one accepts states
as in principle legitimate, as we do. If so, the fact that resources are used
in ways seen as peculiar by others does not undermine the legitimacy of
their use.
What about populations using non-standard measures? For the
immigration problems our world faces, this question is only moderately
relevant. Most potential immigrants wish to enter countries that are
integrated into world markets and thus would find assessments of
resources in terms of prices acceptable. Perhaps there is a danger that, for
example, companies from such countries penetrate regions that do not
desire to be so integrated, much as early immigrants to the Americas
claimed natives did not make the sort of use of resources that creates
entitlements. Yet permission to immigrate does not entitle to doing as
one pleases. So even if there were scenarios where countries' obligations
with regard to immigration were to be assessed by evaluating resources
they wish to have exempted from such a valuation, or by using a measure
they would reject, such dangers of exploitation would not arise. If
indeed such cases do not involve primary immigration destinations, one
may also accommodate exceptions, much in the same way in which liberal states sometimes accommodate religions if this does little harm.
What about the role of luck? Distinguish two cases. First, suppose
all countries abide by a global immigration regime regulated according to
our proposal. In that case, all is done to preserve the sort of symmetrical
claim individuals have with regard to collectively owned resources. Common ownership forbids people from using an undue share of what is
collectively owned under circumstances in which much (most of the land
mass) of what is so owned is divided up among states. But there is no
implication that the use of any particular area must be to each person's
satisfaction, which is what seems to motivate the concerns behind this
question. These concerns arise under Joint Ownership, not under Common Ownership. The second case is that some countries do not respect
an immigration scheme guided by these ideas. There is again no need for
compliant countries to subject their populations to a lottery, but one
needs to ask whether they could prevent immigration above the threshold
of overuse. Yet this leads to questions about compliance when others are
disregarding given standards that are not in any way particular to the
72
common ownership standpoint.
As for the fourth question, it may seem that our proposal sets incentives for countries contrary to what is required for implementing globally
72. See GARRETT CULLITY, THE MORAL DEMANDS OF AFFLUENCE (2004) and
LiAM B. MURPHY, MoRAL DEMANDS IN NONIDEAL THEORY (2000) (both describing
different proposals regarding compliance under such non-ideal conditions).
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adequate environmental and population policies. From a global standpoint, a sustainable population size is needed-a goal that is inconsistent
with unconstrained population growth in countries, which in turn, however, is in a country's interest if it wants to stop immigration. Similarly,
from a global standpoint, environmental policies need to be adopted that
do not worsen global warming and pollution. Yet it seems to be in a
country's interest to consume its resources, thus depleting global resource
reservoirs, if it wants to stop immigration-a practice that inevitably
contributes to these problems. Like in a Prisoners' Dilemma, individual
and collective preferences do not seem to cohere.
However, note here first that, as far as actual waste is concerned,
states would not be permitted to engage in such actions. Common
Ownership does grant individuals a liberty right to use resources, but that
does not amount to authorizing waste of a sort that cannot actually be
counted as "use" in any meaningful sense. Therefore, states would not
be allowed to engage in such wasteful actions either. Instead, Common
Ownership is plausibly understood as entailing trustee-like duties for all
the "earth" it contains. Deliberate wastage of the earth, as opposed to
actual use, violates these duties, calling for compensation to the rest of
the world and possibly for some kind of sanction on top of this. Also, it
seems that incentives of individual countries and global incentives are not
so poorly lined up. To begin with, much of what factors into an assessment of underuse or overuse cannot straightforwardly be depleted (think
of climate). Moreover, countries that waste depletable resources will ipso
facto find themselves with a problem, namely, depleted resources. Similarly, countries that set incentives for population growth will have the
problem of having to design a social system that can absorb these
increases. It seems, therefore, unlikely that countries would adopt such
policies to block demands to entry.
As far as population policy is concerned, one should also recall the
problems of population decrease facing countries like Germany and Italy.
These countries have trouble adopting policies leading to an increase in
population size although this is in the current generation's own best
interest. It seems hard to imagine that at least liberal democracies would
even be able to adopt straightforward policy tools that will motivate
couples to have more children than they otherwise would as a means to
increase the population and prevent future immigration. It seems that
individuals would perceive immigration as a much less immediate threat
than such a decrease in their old-age benefits. To the extent that worries
about perverse incentives are indeed credible, one could consider contractual arrangements at the global level. Implementing our proposal
requires such arrangements anyway (if only to assess how many immigrants each country should take) and could include provisions (denials of
benefits) to undermine such incentives. What is true, on our proposal, is
that a country's obligation to accept immigrants is not entirely a matter
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of its own conditions. What matters is overuse and underuse relative to
average use across countries. But this seems unproblematic to us.
As we also mentioned briefly at the very beginning, a revival of this
collective ownership standpoint could prove fertile to a range of questions that arise in debates about global justice. Rather obvious examples
of what could be explored are whether this standpoint supports any
duties to provide aide to people under certain circumstances, and what
the implications of this standpoint are for the question of how we should
relate to future generations (who might then have to be regarded as
future owners). But here, at any rate, we have only been concerned with
immigration. To sum up: the use of common ownership as an analytic
method suggests that although there is nothing objectionable to the existence of states that exercise control over immigration, we may have
greater duties to foreigners than we conventionally believe. Such duties
are especially greater than what is commonly believed to be the case by
those who, like us, think that there is nothing objectionable about states
in principle. We conclude noting that we have not tried to provide a
complete theory of immigration. We have not tried to articulate all
moral constraints and permissions incumbent upon policy-makers dealing with immigration. We are satisfied if we have identified one area of
inquiry relevant to the task at hand.

